After 1875, cheap grain from the United States and Russia flooded the European markets. Many countries like Germany, France, and Sweden turned to agricultural trade protection, while others, like the UK and Denmark, held on to a free trade position. Belgium adopted a middle position, leaving its grain markets open but protecting animal husbandry, dairy production, and the processing of foodstuffs. The econometric analysis of the votes of Belgian Members of Parliament on four proposals to install protectionist measures on agricultural trade seeks to identify which economic or political interests explain the Belgian policy option.
Introduction
The abolition of protectionist corn laws in all European countries, after 1846, heralded a period of agricultural free trade. By the late 1870s, the agricultural invasion set this policy under severe pressure in most European countries. The massive import of wheat, in particular from Russia and the US, led to a price fall in these products and sparked a renewed demand for agricultural protection by corn producers. On the other hand, the industrial depression starting in the 1870s drove industrial producers to seek protection for industrial products. These elements brought, combined with local political factors such as the Kulturkampf in Germany, electoral victories to conservative political parties favouring the imposition of trade tariffs. In Germany, the elections of 1878 resulted in a government that imposed the protectionist tariff law of 1879. In France, the Republican government adjusted its agricultural trade policy starting from 1881 (Aldenhoff-Hübinger 2005) . In 1888, after elections in 1887 installed a protectionist government, Sweden followed suit by introducing tariffs on a number of agricultural and industrial products. Also, Italy, Spain, and the Austro-Hungarian Empire returned to protection of their home markets. The United Kingdom and Denmark remained free trade oriented (Bairoch 1976 , Kindleberger 1978 , Tracy 1989 , and Irwin 1994 .
The different reactions have raised questions on the determinants of agricultural tariffs in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Interest-based explanations were explored by Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey (1998 ), Sibylle Lehman (2010 , and Lehman and Oliver Volckart (2011) to explain the German and Swedish return to protectionism. Kevin O'Rourke (1997) also finds many countries' reactions to the agricultural invasion consistent with an interest-based account of trade policy formation. These interest-based explanations, using the specific factors model and the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model, seem to work far better for this episode of tariff history than for the explanation of Corn Law Repeal in the United Kingdom (McKeown 1989 , McLean and Bustani 1999 , and Schonhardt-Bailey 2003 and Belgium (Van Dijck and Truyts 2011) in the middle of the century.
In this article, we study the Belgian partial return to agricultural protection in the 1880s and 1890s as a test of interest-based explanations. Belgium is an interesting case for a number of reasons. First, Belgian tariff policy held a middle position between the countries that opted for protectionism and the countries that remained on a free trade course. Second, the Belgian economic structure was very close to the British one. The share of agriculture in GDP dropped from 37% in 1846 to 23.2% in 1880 and 15.84% in 1895 (Goossens 1992 Blomme 1992, p. 277 ). Yet unlike the UK, the outcome of trade policy formation in Belgium led to some protectionist measures. Third, like in Germany, France, and Sweden, the Belgian election of 1884 brought the conservative Catholic party to power. The Liberal government was defeated after battles with the Catholic party and clergy over the position of religion in schools. This 'school war' was to some extent comparable to the Kulturkampf in Germany (Clark and Kaiser 2003) . After 1884, with a clear majority in Parliament and with the agricultural interests agitating for protectionist tariffs, the conservative government only partially embraced a protectionist policy. Free trade for wheat and rye was upheld, while products from animal husbandry and food processing were protected by tariffs. Fourth, the strong statistical tradition of the country, dating back to the pioneering work of Adolphe Quetelet, provides data of exceptional quality and quantity at constituency level ('arrondissement'). This material is used to make an in depth profile of the constituencies.
We study why Belgium did not return to full-fledged agricultural protectionism after the conservative electoral victory in 1884, but rather chose a middle position between protectionist Europe (Germany, France, Sweden) and free trade Europe (UK, Denmark). How did the agricultural invasion and the industrial crisis affect trade policy? Previous qualitative research has analysed the Belgian tariff policy (Suetens 1955, p. 110-116 and 126-135) and the position of the Catholic (Van Molle 1989 and and Socialist parties (Craeybeckx 1973 and 1974; Hüberman 2008) towards the countryside and agricultural policy, but these studies have not systematically analyzed interest-based explanations of the Belgian tariff policy. 1 We study the votes of the Belgian Members of Parliament on four proposals to reinstate trade protection. In our roll-call analysis, we analyse the relative importance of personal economic interests, party politics, ideology, and the economic and demographic interests of Representatives' constituencies as determinants of voting.
Belgium's trade policy 1875--1900
Around 1875, the price decline of wheat and rye on the world market became tangible in Belgium (Figure 1 ). The average wheat price between 1860 and 1870 was 30.35
Belgian Franks for 100kg, while the five year average between 1868 and 1872 was as high as 31.6 fr/100kg. This dropped to a five year average around 1895 of 15.68 fr/100kg (Gadisseur 1990, p. 756-761) . Likewise, the price of rye was halved. The price of meat fell with 25%, and most products of animal husbandry fetched much lower prices. The agricultural interests in Belgium started to demand protectionist tariffs, a demand that became louder after the German adoption of protectionist tariffs in 1879. With prices decreasing further at the beginning of the 1880s and the national 6 elections of 1884 coming closer, the cry for agricultural protection was voiced in Parliament by a number of Catholic politicians. The elections of 10 June 1884 brought a large scale victory for the Catholic party. The agricultural crisis was one major election theme, but only one next to the budget, military policy, and the school war (Van Molle 1989; Lamberts and Lory 1986) . The school war in particular was the major bone of contention. In 1879 and 1881 the Liberal government voted a law that extended and secularised the network of public schools. This led to a protracted polarization between Catholics and Liberals and to the foundation of a Federation of Catholic political organisations in 1884 (Wils 1986 ).
After the electoral victory of June 1884, the Catholic party dominated Belgian Parliament up to the First World War . The Catholic government strengthend the network of Catholic schools in the subsequent years, making the polarisation of political life even stronger (Deneckere 2005, p. 477-500) .
After 1884 agricultural tariffs became an issue that was discussed continuously and intensely for over a decade. In the 1830s and 1840s, the Catholic party had been protectionist minded, but it had left this position for a free trade stance in the 1850s and beyond (Van Dijck 2008; Van Dijck and Truyts 2011) . When agricultural prices began to drop in the 1870s, it were Catholic party members that voiced a preference for tariffs to protect grain production and animal husbandry. The Catholic party was clearly stronger in the more rural districts in the north, while the political strongholds of the Liberals and later the Socialists were the cities and industrial centers of the provinces of Liège and Hainaut (De Smaele 2009 ). Yet, a substantial number of Catholic representatives, under the leadership of their prime minister August Beernaert, resisted agricultural tariffs. The majority of the Liberal representatives, and after 1894 the majority of the Socialists, defended a free trade policy (Craeybeckx 1973 and 1974; Hüberman 2008) . Within a year after the election of 1884, a group of four Catholic representatives consisting of Eugène Dumont, Jules de Burlet, Léon Pastur, and Georges Snoy proposed tariffs on livestock, meat, cereals and flour.
Because of the evolution of the prices, so the submitters of the bill upheld, the value of agricultural lands was declining and so were the rents. On 10 July 1885 the House of Representatives rejected the two articles contained in this bill, proposing on the one hand tariffs for cereals and on the other hand tariffs on live animals and meat (Van which raised moderate tariffs for livestock and meat (Suetens 1955, p. 116; Van Molle, 1989, p. 129-133) . The discussion on the bill only started in April 1887, as political life was interrupted by riots in the industrial centers in March 1886. The reaction of the police and army left 28 laborers dead. The riots had as a consequence, besides the start of a hesitating social policy, that tariffs on breadgrains could easily be depicted as a misery tax that would cause land rents to rise. This would only be in the interest of the landed classes (Suetens 1955, p. 115) . After 1886 no further legislative initiative was taken to introduce taxes on basic breadgrains. Between 1890 and 1894, different bills or amendments were introduced to expand the protectionist measures, but it never came to a vote for various political reasons (Van Molle 1989, p. 134-136) . This changed after March 1894 when the free trade minded prime minister Beernaert was replaced by de Burlet, one of the architects of the protectionist proposals in 1885 and the law of 1887 after political differences in the Catholic party over the tariff question and the reform of the franchise. This and the electoral victory of October 1894 opened the way for the general tariff law of 12 July 1895.
The election of 14 October 1894 was the first election in Belgian history with general male franchise.The agricultural crisis was a major election theme because the Catholics feared that the Socialists would pilfer the farmers' votes. Both the Liberals and the Socialists sought a clear position towards the farming population (Craeybeckx 9 (104 out of 152 seats) with a number of policy measures aimed specifically at the countryside (Van Molle 2008). The Liberals only retained 20 seats in the Lowerhouse out of 61 before the election and for the first time in Belgian history, 28 Socialist representatives entered Partliament (Luykx 1985, p. 178 and 208) .
The ensuing general tariff law of 12 July 1895 did not introduce tariffs for grain, a subject that remained taboo in Parliament, despite the Catholic farmers organisations agitating strongly for grain tariffs. Neither did it increase the tariffs on livestock and meat. The law of 1895 did introduce tariffs on cacao, canned foodstuffs, honey, fresh and dried fruits, cream and milk, gingerbread, flour, pasta, butter and margarine, a number of luxury goods (such as saffron, foie gras, and truffles), and finally one kind of cereal: oats. The law also provided protectionist tariffs for a number of textiles, clothing, tapestry, books, cast iron and ironware, musical instruments, leatherware, watches, hides, perfumes, soap, and so on (Moniteur belge 14 July 1895, p. 2553-2560). The general idea of the protectionist laws of 1887 and 1895 was to orient Belgian agriculture towards the fattening up of livestock, dairy production, fruit and vegetables, and the processing of food. These products and activities were more suited to the Belgian agricultural structure, dominated by small farms, and provided for a higher added value (Van Molle 2008, p. 164).
The winners and losers of free trade: research hypotheses
Our econometric analysis understands a Member of Parliament's preferences in the votes on the two proposals of 1885 and the laws of 1887 and 1895 as a trade-off between his personal convictions and party affiliation, his personal economic interests, and the interests of his constituency, which he must serve to ensure reelection. O'Rourke 1997, Schonhardt-Bailey 1998, and Lehman 2010 have explained the typical theoretical framework, the specific factors and the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson models, used to formulate hypotheses about the interests of the different players in the choice of trade policy. We confront this framework with the Belgian economic structure to formulate our research hypotheses. The specific factors model holds that labor is immobile between sectors (specific) and that therefore the workers and employers in a certain sector have the same sectoral interest. If so, then sectoral interests can be determined from trade balances. Figure 2 depicts the Belgian trade balance for the period 1860-1910 for seven goods and shows which sectors were exporting and which were import-competing. In the second half of the nineteenth century, Belgium became an importer of foodstuffs and an exporter of industrial products. The wheat producers were most severely hit by the agricultural invasion. Livestock had a small net shortage. The self-sufficiency for bread grains plummeted from 62.6% in 1880 to 27.8% in 1910, while the self-sufficiency for meat increased from 85.4% to 95.6% (Blomme 1992, p. 282) . Based on the agricultural trade balances, livestock and wheat producers would be expected to favor protectionism very strongly. On the other hand, Figure 2 shows that Belgium had a number of strong industrial exporting sectors: machines, iron and steel, and primary products such as coal. We expect these industries to be in favor of free trade. Belgium had been strong in textiles, but this sector slowly turned from exporting to import-competing, and would therefore have shifted from a free trade position to favoring protectionism in the first five years of the 1890s. The recovery of the textile sector after 1895 may itself have been the result of the imposed import tariffs.
However, a number of migration researchers have shown that labor was mobile. As the wages were higher in industry, a number of land laborers migrated from the countryside to the industrial centers (Schepens 1973; Stengers 1978; Goddeeris and Hermans 2012) . The development of the Belgian industrial sector meant that labor could find an alternative income outside agriculture. The absolute number of farmers remained stable around 775,000 between the middle of the century and 1896, but the relative importance of agricultural employment dropped quickly from just under 50% in 1846 to about 25% around 1900 (Klep 1976; Blomme 1992) . After the end of the industrial crisis around 1895, the employment in the agricultural sector also descended in absolute terms (De Brabander 1983, p. 36, 46 and annex B; De Moor 2001) . The number of land laborers decreased from 180,000 in 1880 to 161,000 in 1910. As this indicates a certain amount of sectoral mobility, the laborers would be expected to be in favor of free trade. This is consistent with the viewpoint of the Socialists and liberal progressivists as described by Jan Craeybeckx (1973, p. 228) and Michael Hüberman (2008).
Because labor was to a certain extent mobile, we have a closer look at the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model. The Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model understands differences in the relative scarcity of various production factors as an important motivation for international trade. Countries can produce goods more cheaply when this production intensively uses relatively abundant production factors. Countries will export such goods, and import goods produced predominantly with more scarce factors. Trade thus stimulates demand for abundant production factors and reduces demand for relatively scarce factors. Therefore, trade benefits owners of the former and harms owners of the latter. We then particularly expect owners of relatively scarce production factors to request trade protection.
In Belgium capital and labor were the relatively abundant factors. Labor, being mobile, would generally be in favor of free trade. As capital was relatively abundant in Belgium, the most capital intensive heavy industries, such as coal, steel, and machine building, would be in favor of free trade. However, the position of the owners of textile companies, an activity that was much less capital intensive, is unclear.
Relatively speaking, steamships and the development of large-scale agriculture in the U.S. and Russia made land much more scarce in Belgium. Indeed, one of the main effects of the agricultural invasion was the lowering of the value and rent of land (O'Rourke 1997) . In Belgium, the rents dropped in a spectacular manner between 1870 and 1895. In real terms, Belgian leases went down on average with 23% (Vanhaute 2001, p. 31 and 34) . This indicates that landowners would be in favor of protection -in particular those in the constituencies with the largest share of wheat growing. We divide all constituencies into four quartiles according to the share of agricultural land used for growing wheat. Figure 3 depicts the evolution of the average lease prices of agricultural land for these four quartiles and illustrates how lease prices were higher where the land allowed for more wheat production. Most important for our analysis, Figure 3 shows that the decline in lease prices was the steepest in constituencies specialized in growing wheat. But what was the position of the small farmers who received voting rights in 1893?
Lehman (2010, p. 151-152 and 154) and Schonhardt-Bailey (1998, p. 302) argue that the policy preference of the agricultural sector was not homogenous, but depended on farm size and specialization. It would be rational for large farms, specialized in landintensive products such as grain, to be in favor of protectionism. For small farms specialized in labor intensive products, such as fruits and vegetables, or less landintensive products, such as livestock and dairy products, it would be rational to be in favor of free trade. The Belgian agricultural structure was one of smallholdings where population pressure, the equal division of inheritances, and the division of land into smaller units by landlords accelerated the fragmentation of farms in the second half of the nineteenth century. In 1895 ca. 635,000 farms (76.5% of all farms) were smaller than 2 hectare. Vanhaute estimated that 2 ha was the limit to make a distinction between households in which farming provided a sub-income and real commercial agricultural exploitations (Vanhaute 1993) . In 1880, 472,000 farms were even smaller than 0.5 ha. These smallholdings produced almost exclusively for their own needs and only brought occasional surpluses to the market (Segers and Van Molle 2004, p. 56) .
The average farm size in Belgium was 2.3 hectare, much smaller than Denmark (14 ha), Great-Britain (12 ha), or Germany (6 ha). According to Vanhaute (2001) exploitations smaller than 20 ha accounted for two thirds of the agricultural area. It should follow from this structure that a large share of Belgian agriculture would be in favor of free trade. The country counted less than 4,000 farms that were bigger than 50 hectare. These were concentrated in the heavy clay region that ran south of Brussels from the west of the country to Liège in the east (districts of Tournai, Ath, Soignies, Nivelles, Gembloux, and Waremme). It would be expected that farmers in these districts would be in favor of protection.
The Research Data
We have collected data on Representatives' voting behavior, party affiliation, and personal economic background, as well as on the economic, demographic, and agricultural profile of their constituencies. The Representatives' votes in the four roll- The dummy variable PERINDHE represents personal interests in the heavy industry and collects Representatives functioning as board members in the heavy industry (mining, iron and steel, machine building, glass…). The second panel of Figure 6 presents voting according to interests in the heavy industry. The dummy variable PERINTEL collects representatives with an explicitly intellectual professional background. This category collects teachers, university professors, scholarship commissioners, notaries, lawyers, judges, public prosecutors, journalists, writers, bankers, accountants, civil servants, medical doctors, and pharmacists. Note that for instance, industrialists may or may not have finished a higher education, but unless they also maintain any of the abovementioned positions, they are not considered to have an intellectual professional background. The third panel of To capture the importance of the school struggle as a basis of party formation and political power, we characterize the educational profile of a constituency by the variable studcatr. This variable represents the share of primary school children enlisted in Catholic schools in the constituency and was retrieved from the educational census of 1880 (Malou 1881, p. 15-16) . We believe that this variable captures the strength of the network of Catholic organizations and the importance of Catholic opposition against the Liberal school policy in the different constituencies.
Analysis of Representatives voting behavior
In the four votes, eighteen MP's have abstained (eight for the first 1885 vote, none for the second, five in 1887, and five in 1895). We omit these abstentions from our analysis. Subsequently, the votes can be analyzed as a binary variable. We apply a probit analysis on each vote separately, to allow for maximal flexibility and to account for differences in the historical circumstances and in the voted proposals. 4 Figure 8 presents the marginal effects of a probit regression at the means, while taking a Representative's party as well as personal and constituency interests into account. First, party affiliation proves to be a very important predictor of voting. Keeping all else fixed at the mean, a Liberal Representative is on average respectively 97% and 94% less likely to support trade protection in the 1885 votes than a Catholic
Representative. Likewise, the independent and Socialist MP's are both statistically and historically significantly more likely to object trade protection in all four votes than the Catholics.
Second, personal economic background is an important factor, except in 1895.
Representatives with personal interests in agriculture are consistently more likely to support protection, although this effect is never statistically significantly different from 0 at the usual confidence levels. As theory predicts, personal interests in the heavy industry decrease ceteris paribus the likelihood of a protectionist vote, although this is only significant in the two 1885 votes -in other words before the Troubles of Note first that the effect of personal interests is less pronounced when party affiliation is not controlled for. This suggests that party formation was not so much aligned around personal interest based preferences for trade policy. It does suggest that party affiliation in itself was an important predictor of trade policy preferences, independent of personal professional background, and that personal economic interests are an important factor in explaining Representative's deviation from the party line.
Likewise, the effects of agricultural specialization in wheat and rye and of population density is less pronounced if one does not control for party affiliation. This can again indicate that the demographic and agricultural profile of a constituency is a relatively weak predictor of its Representative's party affiliation, but that these can help to explain differences in voting within a party.
This is no longer the case for the industrial profile of a constituency, however. The effects of employment in the heavy and textiles industry is mostly more negative if one does not control for party affiliation. The main industrial centers were traditionally Liberal party strongholds, and these constituencies' preference for free trade in Representatives could rely on average more on the protection of religion in society to ensure reelection, and were as such less inclined to stand up for the agricultural interests. Figure 4 shows that the division of the Catholic party between a free trade oriented faction and a protectionist faction as well as the changing balance of power between these factions are the key to understanding Belgium's change in trade policy in the 1880s and 1890s. Figure 10 illustrates the differences between the Catholic factions by depicting the conditional means of all explanatory variables, and compares these with the means in the Liberal party. In terms of personal interests, the Catholic free trade faction is clearly characterized by more outspoken heavy industry interests than the protectionist faction, and gathers, at least in 1885, more Representatives with intellectual professions. The protectionist Catholics are more prone to have personal agricultural interests and a public sector background. In terms of constituency background, the Catholic party's free trade faction clearly stems from more densely populated constituencies. This is consistent with Craeybeckx's (1973, p. 221 
Conclusions
The Our results also suggest that the pressures on Catholic MP's to profile themselves as defenders of agricultural interests were less pronounced in constituencies where the opposition against the Liberal school policy had been more intense and where Catholic Representatives had already built a solid electoral basis on the defence of the position of religion in education and society.
A remarkable conclusion is that interest based explanations work much better in the study of late nineteenth century agricultural trade policy in Europe than for the study of the repeal of the Corn Laws in the middle of the century. Here, it is important to take one qualitative element into consideration. The main political discussion between 1815 and 1850 was who would lose or gain from free trade in agricultural products. It was clear that the landowners would stand to lose, that industrialists would gain, but the effect on the real incomes of the laborers was much less clear. The lasting legacy of these political debates was not so much a (reversible) free trade policy, but a shared mental blueprint for the interpretation of the effects of tariffs. because the agricultural program of Daens was highly similar to that of the Socialist party. See Craeybeckx (1973, 224) on this issue. 3 The categories indicated by the personal background variables are not mutually exclusive. Teachers and university professors are for instance included in both PERINTEL and PERPUB, and can also be included in PERAGT, e.g. because of being large landowners. 4 For the results reported in this section, we have selected the functional forms which provided the best fit to the data from the set of historically meaningful and interesting specifications and under the constraint that the reported results are robust to alterations in functional form and variable selection. 5 One could argue that the personal economic background of a Representative is similarly codetermined by the interests of his constituency. However, this does not generate particular interpretation (or estimation) problems, and is not intrinsically different from multicolinearity issues at the level of constituency characteristics (for instance correlation between population density and industrialization). As a robustness check, the reader can verify in appendix that the marginal effects of a probit regression with only constituency interests do not differ much from the coefficients reported in Figure 8 .
